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You read ‘Sectarianism in Pakistan’ in category ‘Essay examples’ The weakening and mold of the Mughal Empire, after the death of Aurangzeb Alamgir, paved the way for a qualitatively diverse era inside the Muslim great the Sub-continent.

The new age witnessed, similarly, the onslaught of the English with both colonial time and european agenda and, on the other, the rise of Marhattas and Sikhs. In the mean time, the early successors of Aurangzeb had arrive under the influence of their Shia courtiers, the Sayyids of Barha. It was in response to these advancements that Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) started his reform motion to reassert Islam. Another was the Wahabi movement of Muhammad Ibn ‘Abd ing Wahhab (1703-1787), which started in Saudi Arabia, yet had a superb impact on the religious scene of India.

Both these actions played a serious role in the making of today’s religio-political scene of India and Pakistan. The Wahabi activity emphasised basics, preached cancelling back to the first sources of Quran and Sunnah, and refused many of the enhancements and ethnical adaptations manufactured over decades in the Of india context. It absolutely was vehemently opposed to the Sufi tradition and also other divergent disciplines such as Shia’ism. Essentially, this kind of movement was exclusionist, and far less understanding and accommodative of divergence, heterogeneity and variations in religious matters.

It lambasted the data corruption and laxity of the Muslims’ attitudes and rejected the accommodations and cultural richness of the medieval empire. Their sole emphasis was within the classical legislation, which, inside the view of its champions, was the sum and material of the faith. It was, although many market leaders of the jihad movement are not blind followers of Muhammad Ibn, ‘Abd al Wahhab to justify the term “Wahabi” for them. Provided their extremist credentials, yet , the term was widely recognized and is nonetheless used in Pakistan3 for those with related puritan opinions.

They are also named Ahl-i-Hadith. Shah Wali Ullah, however , started out the most significant reform movement, in the 18th 100 years. Like Wahabis, Shah Waliullah strongly condemned the damaged Sufi persuits and methods, but he was a Hanafi and his version of purified Islam was not completely rejectionist. He himself was a Sufi. He attempted to postulate a great interpretation of Islam that could coalesce into a purified Sufism with a purified Sunnah. The Shah Wali Ullah’s motion later crystallized into the Deoband movement, founded by a few

Qeyamuddin Ahmed, The Wahabi Movement in India (New Delhi: Manohar, 1994), p203. Maulana Qasim Nanotawi, in the then Combined Provinces of British India in 1867. In 1857, Maulana Nanotawi had positively taken portion in the rebellion against the British. Through the Deoband movement, however , he great colleagues wanted to achieve all their goals through peaceful amount of resistance. The goal, under the circumstances, was simply cultural and religious independence and politics independence. Inside the following years, the Deoband movement followed the attitude of calm resistance and non-co-operation on the British.

That they refused to master the The english language language and modern expertise, and emphasised Arabic and teachings of Islamic timeless classics. In religious terms, the Deoband activity continued to largely claim Shah Waliullah’s teachings with puritan emphasis. Originally, the Deoband School had a policy of noninvolvement into sectarian controversies, although later, specifically under Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, the Hanafis started to be divided into opponent groups. Among others, it was since Maulana Gangohi had condemned “the total annual gatherings with the tombs of saints as well as the prevalent rituals of fatihah and milad”.

These distinctions were a manifestation of dissatisfaction of the Deoband School with the issues as they existed and its willpower to improve them. The puritan emphasis of Wahabis and Deobandis produced tensions among Muslims. The followers of Sufi Islam did not agree to the puritan emphasis which usually, in their watch, amounted to renunciation of mystic getting pregnant of Islam. It was, however , Maulana Ahmad Raza Khan (1856-1921) who also founded the Brelvi School4 by making a 4 Usha Sanyal, Devotional Islam and Politics in British India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Activity, 1870-1920 (Delhi, Oxford University or college Press, 1996), p44. adrasa at Breli in the United Provinces. As opposed to the puritans, the Brelvi school indicated and suffered “the interpersonal and religious customs of the decadent people: the world, or deficiency of it, in which India fell following the feudal Mughal culture got succumbed and before a brand new culture came about under the imperial British transmission. ” In the meantime, Lucknow came into existence the middle of Shia activism. The confrontation among these educational institutions later spread to the complete of the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent. Particularly, it triggered increased incidents of Shia-Sunni violence.

Later on, however , the emergence of Amada movements, whose president, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, believed to be the telepathist, prompted a unified effect from all of the above mentioned schools. The Ahmadis, who are also called since Qadianis and Mirzais, had been declared non-Muslims by all of the above organizations. This declaration was created on the basis that they will not believe in the finality in the prophet cover of Muhammad. This controversy overshadowed the differences among the rest of the sectarian groups for decades right up until they were officially declared non-Muslims through a Constitutional Amendment in Pakistan in 1974.

The nature of Shia-Sunni violence under the United kingdom was radically different than it turned out under the earlier Muslim empires or caliphates. Previously, it had been always a conflict possibly between the proven Sunni regulators and anti-status quo Shia denominations or between the Sunni and Shia dynasties or caliphates. Under the alien secret of the United kingdom, the discord declined towards the communities’ level, involving the public and theologians alike in sectarian violence.

The role of the govt was limited to that of arbiter, enforcer of law or perhaps manipulator, in the event so required, in the bigger colonial interests. However , the state of hawaii was secular and largely unrepresentative and, therefore , the application of sectarian redensart was restricted to the purpose of selfidentification. The problem of sectarian discord in the post-independence years could be analyzed in terms of the continuation of aged historical design with selected new attributes and, like a direct outcome of downturn of identification and governance in Pakistan.

It may be noted that the political discourse for macro level has revolved around the problems of Islamization vs . modernization, centralization or provincial autonomy, and democracy vs . authoritarianism in Pakistan since freedom. The prolonged ambivalence to these issues \leads the Pakistani State in a crisis of identity, triggering frustration among almost all the sections of contemporary society including modernists, Islamists and various cultural communities.

The frustration is now further increased in view of the failure of successive governments on the functionality front, especially in terms of giving thanks representation to the marginalized sections of society in the top express institutions. Sectarian Conflicts in Pakistan: There are numerous sectarian categories in Pakistan. One origin puts the overall number of Muslim sects and sub sects at 72. 5 The Sunni population subdivides in to four key streams”Deobandis, Barelvis, Ahl-e Hadith and Wahabis”and within these types of there are your five Sectarian Division of Muslims (Bureau Report), The days, London, twenty eight Sept. 1998. reportedly a large number of subgroups6. Inspite of these categories, the majority of Sunnis in Pakistan follow the Hanafi School of Islamic jurisprudence7 The Sunni population can be estimated to get 74 % of Pakistan’s population. The three Shia channels in Pakistan are the Ismailis, the Ithna Ashariyya plus the Bohras. almost eight Estimates from the size of the Shia population vary widely, from a decreased of a few per cent into a high of 25 %, most resources put it in 15-20 %. During the Pakistan movement, the essentially luxurious leaders with the Muslim Little league had employed the redensart of ‘Muslim identity’ to mobilize public and to warrant a separate homeland for them. Curiously, almost all the religious parties of that time had compared the demand of Pakistan both on the grounds that the idea of separate nationhood was not tenable from the point of view of Islam, or the secular leadership of Muslim League cannot be dependable to sincerely fulfill the assurance of the creation of an Islamic state.

Nonetheless, the Muslim League prevailed in creating Pakistan, in spite of the opposition of religious parties. Consequently, the Islamic identity with the migrant neighborhoods, which completed mostly in the urban areas of Punjab and Sindh, was reinforced and so they began to become the major motor vehicle for the Islamization advertising campaign in Pakistan. It was, contrary to other cultural groups just like Sindhis, Baluchis and Pakhtuns who, although de-emphasizing the ideological debate, championed the cause of decentralization and provincial autonomy. 6 several The Sub-Sects of Muslims (Report), The Economist, London, uk, 28 By 1995. Daniel Pipes, Islam and Islamic Groups (Detroit: Gale Research, 1992), p184. 8 Ibid. p185. 9 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi’i and Sunni Identities, Contemporary Asian Research, Vol. 32, No . several, July 1998. Gradually, groupings emerged from the existing faith based parties, which started focusing the sectarian differences with the professed aim of persuading the state of hawaii to accept their unique views in to legislation as well as its policies.

In the following years, Punjab was going to become the main victim of sectarian violence. Today sectarian violence is becoming widespread, especially between Shi’a and Sunni militants in areas highlighting Afghanistan, while dozens of tribe elders had been murdered simply by militants in Waziristan. REASONS FOR SECTARIAN ASSAULT IN PAKISTAN This section talks about the main factors which triggered sectarian assault in Pakistan. Pakistan, one of the largest Muslim countries the earth, has seen serious Shia-Sunni sectarian violence. Almost 70 percent of Pakistan’s Muslim human population is Sunni, and one other 30% are Shia.

Yet , but this kind of Shia community forms the other largest Shia population of any region, 10 bigger than the Shia majority in Iraq. Within the last two decades, as much as 4, 500 people are predicted to have passed away in sectarian fighting in Pakistan, three hundred in 2006. eleven Amongst the causes blamed for the eliminating are Al Qaeda functioning “with neighborhood sectarian groups” to eliminate what they understand as Shi’a apostates, and “foreign forces , looking to sow discord. “12 twelve Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (Newyork: Norton, 2006), p160. “Shiite-Sunni conflict goes up in Pakistan, ” by David Montero, February 02, 2007. 10 12 Shiite-Sunni conflict increases in Pakistan, ” by simply David Montero, February 02, 2007. Since 2004, there has been strong violence in the FATA. What started in Southern Waziristan, slowly spread to North Waziristan in 2006 and then later to Bajaur and Mohamand Agency during 2006 and 2007. The past two years, this violence has spread to the settled districts of the Khyber Pakhtoonkhawa including Bannu, DI Khan, Peshawar and Swat. Led by the Taliban and its community supporters in the FATA and Khyber Pakhtoonkhawa, this assault is disguising a serious menace to the technique of governance, tough the writ of the State.

Referred to by media since Talibanization, these types of developments is the subject of intense academic, media and policy interest. Many elements contributed to the expansion of sectarian violence since the 1980s and 90s. Although some were direct causes, other folks indirectly deepened the sectarian fault lines. Some of them are: Sectarian Politics: The following factors increased the sectarian separate, which was stuck in Pakistaner society in the 1980s, especially in Punjab. First, the formation of Shia and Sunni partisan organizations that have been not associated with their individual communities however was support from them.

The formation of the militant Sunni Sipah-i-Sahaba, Pakistan (SSP) and the Shia Sipah-i-Mohammad, Pakistan (SMP) was the main factor underlying the escalating discord between the two communities. Apart from the Sipah-i-Sahaba, various other Sunni companies like Sunni Tehrik had been formed in Sindh. Later some SSP activists led by Riaz Basra organized the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ), named after the creator of the SSP. The LJ was even more militant and has been prohibited. These businesses widened the sectarian split and equally groups started out using physical violence against the other person. The strength of these kinds of militant sectarian organizations elevated in the eighties nd 90s, and they were only suspended by General Musharraf in January 2002. Second, factionalism within the religious parties and militant companies deepened the sectarian split. The Jamiat-ul-Islam (JUI) got divided into two factions led by Fazl-ur-Rahman and Sami-ul-Haq and equally factions attempted to build their particular foundations upon anti-Shia tenets with each trying to become more virulently anti-Shia. Even the militant organizations on both sides (the SSP and the SMP) confronted divisions, and these factions, devoid of effective leadership, had been involved in arbitrary killings of the other community.

Religious parties like the JUI supplied indirect support to adepte organizations. You have to understand that sectarian violence is essentially limited to Punjab, especially in the district of Jhang, where the popular religious celebrations never appreciated popular support. Baluchistan had been free of sectarian violence and so was Sind immer wieder, except for Karachi. The Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), which likes support with the popular level in Punjab belongs to the Brehlvi faith and does not share the antagonism of the Deobandis and Wahabis on the Shias.

In fact , unlike the latter two, the JUP looks at them to always be Muslims and a part of the Islamic globe. Third, sectarian violence in Punjab was primarily because of Shia-Sunni economic, social and political associations. For example in Jhang, wherever sectarian violence is large, the Shia community varieties the upper school, being landlords and savoring political power, the majority Sunni community forms the lower assise in the interpersonal, economic and political hierarchy. When the Sunni middle school grew, especially in the 1970s due to better education and remittances from the Gulf of mexico, they demanded their reveal of ocial and personal status, which was resisted by Shias. Maulana Nawaz Jhangvi, assassinated in 1990 simply by Shia résistant, formed the Sipah-i-Sahaba in Jhang in1985, largely to fight the Shia homeowners. Anti-Shia organizations: Anti-Shia groups in Pakistan include the Lashkar i Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, offshoots of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). The teams demand the expulsion of most Shias coming from Pakistan and still have killed a huge selection of Pakistani Shias between 1996 and 99. 13 As in Iraq that they “targeted Shia in their o places and mosques, especially during times of public prayer. “14

From January to May possibly 1997, Sunni terror groups assassinated 75 Shia community leaders “in a systematic try to remove Shias from positions of power. “15 Lashkar i Jhangvi has declared Shia to get `American agents` and the `near enemy` in global jihad. 16 Islamization policies of Zia: Islamic policies presented by Zia-ul-Haq were also responsible for the growth of sectarian violence inside Pakistan. An specific analysis will reveal the particular policies were cosmetic and peripheral, as they did not impinge 13 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Islam, oil and the fresh great game in central Asia (London: Tauris, 2000), p194. 14

Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (Newyork: Norton, 2006), p166. Vali Nasr, The Shia Resurrection (Newyork: Norton, 2006), p167. Ibid. p168. 15 sixteen on the bureaucratic military oligarchy or the se?orial structure of the society. In fact , these policies were geared towards gaining capacity within Pakistan and were not meant to challenge the existing interpersonal and monetary institutions. Nevertheless , the Islamization policies exerted a negative effect on the two communities. The Sunni religious parties led by JUI and JUP became effective vis-a-vis the Shias, because they wanted the State to introduce the Sunnization of Pakistan, which the Shias feared.

This made the Shias defensive and they started out supporting the PPP. In July 80, 25, 500 Shia portested the Islamization laws in the capital Islamabad. Besides, all of the changes made by Zia led to strong competition amongst the various Sunni groups, particularly the Wahabis, Deobandis and Brehlvis, as they desired the State to enforce their particular version of Islam, especially the Islamic laws, though these people were united inside their opposition to Shias. Yet , the Islamic reforms introduced by Zia, especially associated with the legal field, concerned the Shia community.

The Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-iJafriya (TNFJ) was formed more than three decades ago to put in force the Jafri fiqh, earlier in the same year Zia had declared that the Hanafi fiqh can be enforced. The organization of TNFJ was the politics response of the Shia community. In its our childhood it battled to get concessions just like exempting the Shia community from spending zakat and ushr. Jihad in Afghanistan: Pakistan’s Cover policy inside the 1980s and 90s cut sectarian violence inside the country. Afghan amount of resistance against the Soviet Union inside the 1980s led to the expansion and easy availability of small arms in Pakistan. 7 The emergence of and future growth of the Taliban inside the 1990s and 17 Jordan Klare, “Redefining Security: The modern Global Schisms, Current Record, Vol. 95, No . 604, 1996, p161. their support to Sunni organizations including the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen impinged directly on sectarian violence. The Sipah-i-Sahaba cartouche were competed in Afghanistan and a lot of them fought the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Shias inside Pakistan. Iran-Iraq Conflict: The impact of the emergence in the Khomeini routine in 1979 in Iran as well as the subsequent Iran-Iraq war more than 30 years ago on sectarian violence in Pakistan provides generally been underestimated.

It really is no coincidence that the TNFJ, the main Shiite party in Pakistan, was created in 1979. If the Iran-Iraq warfare started, the Muslim universe got divided into two camps and started funding their faith. Consequently, enormous money flowed, especially from Arab saudi and Usa, into Pakistan to support the various Sunni and Shia companies and the écharpe as work by all of them respectively, that were directly in charge of the growth of organized opposition and physical violence. Iranian Financing: Exacerbating tensions is Iranian funding of Shia extremists in Pakistan, who not simply exact vengeance against Sunnis, but have already been used to violently uppress Iranian dissidents near your vicinity who will be critical with the Iranian routine. Shia formed student associations and a Shia get together with the fundings from Serbia, Sunni started to form sectarian militias hired from Deobandi and Ahl-i Hadith madrasahs. Preaching against the Shia in Pakistan was radical cleric Israr Ahmed. Muhammad Manzour Numani, a senior American indian cleric with close jewelry to Arab saudi published a book entitled “Iranian Revolution: Imam Khomeini and Shiism. The book, which became “the gospel of Deobandi militants 18 in the 1980s, attacked Khomeini and argued the excesses in the 8 Vali Nasr, The Shia Rebirth (Newyork: Norton, 2006), p164. Islamic revolution were proof that Shiism was not the doctrine of misguided siblings, but past the Islamic pale. Pakistan is the simply Sunni bulk country exactly where Shias have already been elected to top office buildings and played out an important component in the country’s history and land building. The founder of Pakistan Muhammed Ali Jinnah, Muhammad Ali Bogra plus the Bhutto relatives are Shia Muslims, being Asif Ali Zardari, Abida Hussian, Faisal Saleh Hayat and several other top rank Pakistani Political figures and Officers such as Yahya Khan, Musa Khan and

Iskander Mirza. Jihad in Kashmir: Pakistan’s support and involvement in Kashmir was also in charge of sectarian physical violence. While the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Hizbul Mujahideen will not indulge in sectarian violence inside Pakistan, the same cannot be said about various other jihadi teams, especially the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and, its later incarnation, the Jaish-eMohammad. Both these teams were trained in Afghanistan underneath the Taliban and were near Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, one of the most violent Sunni organization. Ahead of the Musharraf plan started it is rackdown on sectarian companies in 2001, these three were linked to collecting funds for jihad in Kashmir. The security firms could not do much, because they could not identify which business was included. Tribal Issue in the khyber Pakhtoonkhawa: Tribe clashes among Pashtun people in the Northwest Frontier Region have also used on a sectarian nature, together with the Shia Orakzai tribe frequently battling with all their Sunni neighbors. These schisme are based around the community of Bannu, and have often turned deadly.

However , the conflict is definitely rooted in centuries’ old land differences, and offers only used on a sectarian nature because the fanatic Taliban regime came into power in nearby Afghanistan in the nineties. The Madrassas: Various madrassas, especially in Punjab and Karachi, accentuated existing sectarian tits. Each Sunni schism (Deobandi, Brehlvi, Wahabi) and Shias ran their own madrassas pertaining to providing fundamental education. The curriculum was decided by madaris. Therefore, when sectarian fault lines got pronounced, a hate campaign was introduced vis-a-vis the different sect.

Besides, the madrassas also presented manpower for anyone sectarian businesses, leading to sectarian engagements on the streets and dividing these people further. Regarding one-third in the 2, 50019 registered madrassas in Punjab are recognized to impart armed service training to their students, and be directly involved in sectarian attacks. The communities started out defending their faith by protecting and supporting the offenders instead of condemning their very own violence. This support got the form of political, personal and economical patronage, which in turn only emphasized the cycle of assault. 19

Iqbal Quadir, “Madrassa Culture in Pakistan, HRCP Journal, Volume. 8, Number 3, November 1998. FAILURE OF POINT OUT What have been clear since the beginning of the sectarian turmoil in Pakistan is the complete failure with the State, from Zia’s period onwards. It absolutely was unfortunate that during Zia’s period inside the 1980s the Turis of Kurram Agency became the pawns in Pakistan’s greater game in Afghanistan. The state of hawaii failed to understand Turi concerns and low self-esteem, and has failed to understand all of them ever since. The emergence of the Taliban and the growth of sectarian politics inside the 1990s further aggravated the case.

Given the sensitivities the state of hawaii forces must have taken extra care in preventing the movement of battle toughened Sunni Taliban with their sectarian streak in sensitive locations. Unfortunately, the state of hawaii was hardly ever keen in enforcing it is writ in the tribal firms. The queries of California’s failure ought to be seen in the context of its wider historical insufficient interest in preserving its writ in the FATA. It allowed its writ to go in the name of maintaining tribal traditions and customs. It also exploited precisely the same customs and traditions to pursue its larger proper interests in Afghanistan.

The Pakistani point out has failed to know that the scenario has been dramatically changing over the last decade. A piece within the FATA, especially between the younger technology, is highly motivated by the Taliban-al Qaeda model of Islam, and prefers to comply with their Islamic principles, rather than the age old secular tribal customs of the Pashtuns, referred to as Pashtunwali. Another section, within the fresh generation, subjected to modern education and democratic ideals, likes the xpansion of California’s functions in to tribal locations. Though both above fields of youth adults are highly anti-American, they avoid agree with the way they are being governed. As the Taliban proponents prefer to become governed below Shariah, the more modernminded others want the State expand the governance process. Thus, the two sections need to repeal the archaic FCR, but also for different factors. More importantly, inside the above two schools of thoughts, precisely what is also little by little eroding is the influence of elders and jirga governmental policies.

The jirga provides a prefect excuse to get the State to keep away from the problems and provides musical instrument to maintain rules and order. Failure of governance also provided space for different groups to express the local statements. While consist of parts of the FATA, this kind of expression features taken a religious (orthodox Sunni version followed by Taliban) course, in Orakzai and Kurram, they have also thought a sectarian nature. The influence of these sectarian companies can be battled by the State only by simply expanding the governance procedure inside these types of regions.

CONCLUSION Since the past due 1980s, the Shia-Sunni sectarian violence provides engulfed almost the entire province of Punjab and particular parts of the North-Western Frontier Province (Khyber pakhtoonkhawa ). Though sectarian conflict is not a new phenomenon, the scope, depth and the continuity of the recurring violent phase are unmatched in the history of Pakistan. Jhang in Punjab province was the first section to land prey to the increased and chronic nature of sectarian assault in the eighties.

The Shia-Sunni sectarian conflict cannot be described in spiritual and ideological terms alone, notwithstanding the fact that the spiritual and sectarian idiom is generally used by faith based leaders through the pulpit to encourage violence, mobilize all their followers and achieve personal goals. Inside the context of sectarian violence, the local in-text realities have been of essential significance. The external stimuli might have enjoyed some catalyst role with regards to triggering off and accelerating the process of shift from the foul sectarian issue to the violent one.

But you may be wondering what is important to note is that the efficiency of exterior stimuli and the nature of reaction they might provoke happen to be determined with the local amounts. The likelihood of a shift from dormant to violent discord, however , raises if the institutional and legal structures in a given express fail to adjust and cater to to the changing socio-economic facts and/or shortage capacity to successfully respond and check the exterior stimuli. Shia-Sunni conflict is definitely primarily a manifestation with the socio-economic alterations at the home town level, which have given rise to politics tensions between different classes of contemporary society.

Selected Bibliography Secondary Options Books: Ahmad, Mumtaz. `Continuity and Change inside the Traditional System of Islamic Education: The Case of Pakistan’. (Karachi: Oxford College or university Press, 2000). Ahmed, Qeyamuddin. The Wahabi Movement in India (New Delhi: Manohar Press, 1994). Jafri, H. H. M. The Roots and Early on Development of Shia Islam (Karachi: Oxford University or college Press, 2000). Kraan, T. D. Faith based Education in Islam with Special Mention of the Pakistan: An intro and Bibliography (Rawalpindi: Christian Study Centre, 1984).

Nasr, Vali. The Shia Rebirth (Newyork: Norton, 2006). Nasr, Vali. Mawdudi and the Producing of Islamic Revivalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). Rashid, Ahmed. Taliban: Islam, Essential oil and the Fresh Great Game in Central Asia (London: Taurus, 2000). Rashid, Ahmed. Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002). Sanyal, Usha. Devotional Islam and Politics in Uk India: Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi and His Movement, 1870-1920 (Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996). Newspaper:

Ahmed, Khalid. `The Power of the Ahle Hadith’, The Friday Times, Lahore, 12-18 July 2002. Journal: Haqqani, Husain. `Islam’s Medieval Outposts’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No . you, 2002, pp58-64. Klare, Michael. “Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms, Current History, Volume. 95, No . 604, 1996, P161 Seminar paper Sectarianism in Pakistan Submitted to: Professor Doctor Naseem Posted by: Mati ullah Tareen IR next Department of International Associations Quaid-i-Azam University or college Islamabad, Pakistan.